Strong words perhaps - I shall stand by them. Given what was available to steam prior, and then what put to sea just after Taranto was a hugely weakened force. I am afraid sentimentality over the RMI aside, there is no arguing with the numbers.
Two Battleships (from six) The five undamaged heavy cruisers (I know wikipedia states six, I have source texts which I trust more which disagree, but its much of a muchness). Fourteen of the Twenty-one destroyers. No submarines. From the sixteen which were moored in the inner harbour at Taranto.
Weighting the numbers with the size and importance of what was unavailable - I feel safe saying the RMI's fleet was reduced by two thirds in a night, which is a very severe blow if not crippled. Couple this with the order given to the Italian commander sailing after Taranto to avoid engaging with force H (which they sailed to disrupt) unless the odds were heavily in his favour - it is difficult to argue that the RMI would recover its previous capability until March-May of 1941 when the damaged battleships were repaired. Certainly not to the point where they would be able to contend with both the Western and Eastern Mediterranean RN fleets. I wont go into the RMI's lack of a naval air wing or even sufficient doctrine to deal with torpedo attacks, that is another question all together.
Just to be clear - I'm by no means attempting to rubbish the RMI (noting your avatar) or anything they achieved / failed to achieve, just trying give an objective look at why the RMI was not able to aid the German High Seas fleet as much as it would have perhaps liked. There was by no means anything perfect about the RN or the attack on Taranto, but to doubt that it massively hampered the at sea effectiveness of the RMI for ~6 months is not smart.
