Historynerd

Whoever it is that gave me a -1, thanks for not even caring to put in an explanation. You think what I wrote is wrong? You think it's garbage and I'm biased? Very well, just tell us. Just give us your opinion, and why you think what I wrote is the stupidest thing in the world. I'll accept that. But if you just downvote me, without explaining, you're just proving my point.

All I'm saying is, it's very likely that before the RN tree shows up there will be one or perhaps even more British premium ships. In top of that, in CBT we had a British premium. So, your wait will not be very long, or without a treat sometimes along the road either. Others who might be interested in other ships will have to wait longer and with less chances of seeing a premium. I'm just asking to take this into consideration. It's only fair, after all.

I'm not sure if I agree with that... Let's take into consideration the fact that after all, her armor scheme would have improved, but it was not very impressive to begin with, for the standards of 1941. Her belt armor was only 305 mm thick, which while good for WWI would probably not have been considered safe against the newer and heavier naval guns of WWII. There is quite a difference between the British 15-inch Mark I, of WWI vintage, and the German 38 cm/52 SK C/34. The latter, as the newest guns, had theoretically a higher RoF, had a better range, and had more punch. Just look it up on the NavWeaps site. Caliber is not an absolute value, it has to be put together with all the factors (RoF, range, armor penetration,...).

To be honest, I am a bit tired of this constant complaining about British ships and their supposed scarcity... you guys got the Warspite; you could play with it for a while. People like me who are going to do a triple somersault when we get an Italian tech tree (or other people who would do likewise for the French tree, same idea) are going to be waiting a lot more than what you British ship lovers are going to wait, even for a premium. For crying out loud, be a little grateful for what you got...

So it's you demanding that the mods do what you'd like, and nothing else? Okay, go right ahead. Knock yourself out

Oh, alright then... way to encourage a discussion...

To me it seems that a person uses those kind of words either on troll or in ranting posts...

I meant in a battle fleet. As in, those that fought at Midway, Guadalcanal, the Philippine Sea and Leyte. And I already said that submarines were never an organic part of them. They might have had a part operationally, but they were not under the same command tactically as the other ships. Those are two different dimension, and mixing them up makes for poor strategists and tacticians. I don't hate them; I played Silent Hunter 3 a lot. I just don't think they belong in this game. I think I am entitled to be interested in them, but get to the conclusion that in this game they would be out of place, right? And take notice that if I thought otherwise, this would help out the Italian tech tree, a matter that matters quite a lot to me. Because the Regia Marina did operate a lot of submarines, and some of them did pretty good in the Atlantic; so this would help the cause of getting this particular navy in the game ASAP. But alas, I cannot do that.

So where do we draw the line? We probably have different opinions on this, but I draw the line where submarines were never an organic part of a fleet, whereas aircraft carriers, battleships, cruisers and destroyers all were.

Very well, then let's take a look at the Japanese commanders. Midway? The submarine force was under the command of Admiral Komatsu, staying on board the cruiser Katori at Kwajalein. It was nominally part of Admiral Kondo's invasion fleet, so not the force expected to engage the main American naval counterattack that was expected. I admit I do not know if Kondo issued any orders directly to any of the submarines, or if he did send orders accordingly to Komatsu at Kwajalein; but it doesn't look to me that it supports your point to any relevant degree. Leyte Gulf? I admit I do not know if any Japanese submarine played a relevant part in this series of engagements, and if they depended directly from any of the senior fleet commanders (Kurita, Ozawa, Nishimura, Shima).

Really? Could you please cite the source for having either Fletcher, Spruance or Halsey directly ordering submarines around, instead of having to relay that on Nimitz at Pearl Harbour and him then relaying the orders to the COMSUBPAC? While not during the surface engagement, both at Punta Stilo and Matapan the British carriers carried out attacks at the Italian ships; in the former case without result, in the latter case causing heavy damage on the Vittorio Veneto and crippling the Pola, which ultimately led to other two heavy cruisers and two destroyers to turn around to be slaughtered. However, generally they could not attack during the engagement because they needed time to get their aircraft going, so it's not like a surface ship that can start firing, albeit perhaps in a disorganized fashion, after a little while (and at Cape Matapan and the sinking of the Italian cruiser, it was because it was nighttime, and night time carrier operations were still below the horizon). If we talk about surface battles, how about all the times when even battleships (fast ones, but battleships nonetheless) acted as carrier escorts, supporting them with their AA batteries, and only when a surface engagement became probable they were detached to form a surface only force?

I disagree; even though they were not surface combatants, there was no 100% separation amongst carriers and the other components of a surface fleet. Example: in the days leading to the battle of Leyte, Admiral Halsey used to issue orders directly to each Task Group of Task Force 38, over its rightful commander, Admiral Mitscher. And also in the Mediterranean, where for example during the battle of Punta Stilo or Cape Matapan the carrier was not a hundred miles behind the main surface force, but was sailing alongside it.

Well, perhaps because one needs to draw a line somewhere. And also because we demonstrated that submarines as an organic part of a surface battle fleet were never a thing.

How can we talk about tactical flexibility, when submarines were never part of a unified tactical command together with aircraft carriers, battleships, cruisers and destroyers? Their own characteristics and performances made them unsuitable for service together (and I mean in a tactically coordinated way) with a battle fleet. The same characteristics and performances do not support having them in game, no matter if teamwork by players still has a long way to go.

In what instances in which this happened was said submarine or submarines part of the enemy surface fleet, i.e. under the direct tactical command of the enemy admiral, instead of being on a separate chain of command?

I agree; so perhaps it might be time to wake up...

On that, we are in full agreement.

Well, this is what OP is proposing, I think... And incidentally, what you say is very true. And that's why I'm saying that the difference lies precisely in their not being at the direct command of a surface fleet. Besides, what happened at Midway and at the Marianas was remarkable, absolutely; however, for each sub that stumbled upon such a juicy target, there were many others that failed to even spot a target. It was something like throwing a dice - the subs were deployed, and it was hoped that some of them would manage to sight the enemy and land some hits. But there were no guarantees about that; for example, the Force Z managed to slip through the edge of the submarine picket line that was looking for it, when sailing north. So, it looks to me that it was more rather what they hoped that submarines could do, and less what the submarines had to do, differently from the other ships (those we can find in-game). And besides, the commanding admiral knew they were out there, sure, but he couldn't do anything about it, directly. All he could do was report back, and through the whole chain of command if needed a submarine could be moved... but that was it. There was no way, for example, to move submarines to intercept a fleeing enemy, for example, if he was fleeing towards another direction. Basically... in this business, I think it's the tactical dimension that counts the most. And the fact that submarines are outside the tactical control of the commander of the surface fleet in my opinion is what really gets in the way here.

I instead think that, if they weren't under the direct tactical control of the admiral commanding the surface fleet, submarines couldn't be considered an "organic part" of said fleet, even if they had to play a part in an encounter with the enemy. That's all. Therefore, I tend to think that for them to be considered as you said "active parts" of the fleet is a bit too much. But I got what you mean, and I get what you meant. That's what matters. And if we end up disagreeing on these differences... well, not a problem. We all are entitled to our own opinions, with each having equal weight. So, it's all good.

Sorry, but no,perhaps I wasn't clear enough, but I don't see how my statement was "broad". That's what I said: "Organic part", to me that's clear enough, meaning submarines being fully integrated into a surface force put together for a surface battle, instead of being separated. Perhaps I didn't consider Jutland, that can be taken as a question mark, but even if we confirm it as an instance when it happened, it would have been the exception that confirms the rule.

What both of you say is absolutely true. But to me the most important factor remains that, except maybe for Jutland (but in that case it didn't matter, as the submarines were deployed away from the place where a battle might have taken place, and they were supposed to operate separately nonetheless), they weren't assigned as a part of said battlefleets, but answered to other commands.

What I meant was, when were the submarines directly dependent from the surface fleet's commanders? At Midway, under Task Force 16 or 17? Nope, they answered to Admiral English, COMSUBPAC. At the Marianas, under Admiral Spruance's 5th Fleet? Nope, they were at the orders of Admiral Lockwood, the new COMSUBPAC. At Jutland? Well, they tried to give them a direct role, but just of softening up the Grand Fleet before the surface battle, not during it. And did it work? Nope. This is what I mean. in a surface battle, an admiral is supposed to give orders to the ship at his command. But in historical naval battles up to WWII no admiral ever gave an order to a submarine placed under his direct command, because there weren't any. Simple as that.

"Fleet submarines" doesn't mean that they were a part of a fleet: for the Americans it was just a way to distinguish the new long-ranged submarines from the older ones, and because when surfaced they had a top speed of 21 knots, the same as the Standard-class battleships, so theoretically when surfaced they could keep up with them (but they couldn't have done it with the newer fast battleships, though). Look up for a major naval battle in which submarines had a part, and they were an organic part of a surface battle fleet - there isn't one.

Not even mentioning the small fact that, while battleships, aircraft carriers, heavy and light cruiser and destroyers were all legitimately part of historical battle forces, submarines weren't. They tried to have them fit in, but it didn't work.