Historynerd

Well done. +1 for you, kind sir!

I doubt that WG will start spouting premiums (and there should be lots of premiums to end up with the Spanish ones, IO think) like you say. Beside, the demand for the RN tree is quite high, so they won't delay it. And by this logic, other trees (like the French or the Italian ones) would be very much more threatened than the British one.

...As if this proposal might take precedence or even delay in the strangest possible way the RN tree...

Overall, I agree, these ships (and especially Bismarck) have in the minds of some people a reputation not exactly warranted by their characteristics or by their audacious feats. I have to say that someone might raise his eyebrows reading what you wrote about the Regia Marina, since to many people it's kind of synonimous with cowardice and with running towards the port everytime the Royal Navy was met. And while it's true that the Italian battleships were always deployed in a very cautious way, leading to unimpressive combat results, it could be said that they contributed to the same effect that Tirpitz did, i.e. tying down RN resources. After all, the British Pacific Fleet (the first RN fleet in the Far East capable of facing the Japanese on even terms) could be assembled only late in the war, where the threats of the Kriegsmarine and the Regia Marina had been respectively quite reduced and neutralized. Still I appreciate your remarks that, over the hype for ships like these, it is worth pointing out and introducing lesser known navies and ships. However, in-game I must admit that the Tirpitz allows for some experimenting, and I look forward to seeing what will be the results. Especially the fact that it has torpedoes... what will its effect on balance be? Should be interesting.

It was widespread before WWI, but in the years of the conflict it was already in decline as it was impractical. In WWII it was used on some merchantmens with not so negative results, but nothing more than that (no men-of-war).

Those could be used only at low speeds, as at higher ones they would just rise and lose all effectiveness. Also, their drag could significantly reduce a ship's speed.

I think I read that later model of torpedo nets could be used when the ship was sailing at moderate speed (such as inferior to 10 knots). But by that time (WWI years) it was becoming rather ineffective against the newer torpedo models being used. I have never heard of a ship firing at torpedoes; I have read of fighters that tried to shoot torpedoes with their MGs, but this was done also to alert the ship to its presence. Its effectiveness is highly in doubt. But I agree with you, overall.

I had the impression that, if a ship had some kind of anti-torpedo defense system (bulkheads and something like that), it did have an effect and it did influenced the amount of damage that a torpedo would do. But those are passive defences. As for active defences, there aren't any. And please stop with all that garbage about "anti-torpedo guns"... these are the secondary anti-ship armament meant to take care of the "torpedo boats" that when appearin first threatened the predominance of the battleship in a way never considered first. But they didn't fire at the torpedoes.

I know, right? It seems he didn't go very deep into it, because he predicted (not that I can fault him for that) that the VV wouldn't get any trophy.

"Quod gratis adfirmatur, gratis negatur." Meaning, what is asserted gratuitously may be denied gratuotiusly. So, in the end... either you present some hard evidence, or you will never be taken seriously. No third way here.

Don't worry... just a LOL moment!

I'm curious, what's an Ohio-class BB? I don't know that one...

To my knowledge, even after many airplanes had overflown, attacked and sunk both the Yamato and the Musashi the USN was in the dark about, if not the real displacement, the main gun's caliber. Besides, at Leyte Gulf despite heavy air opposition a surface engagement became a distinct possibility. So, "total surprise"? Not strictly necessary.

One characteristic of the Yamato-class battleships was the secrecy that surrounded their construction, and the scarcity of information about them that reached the ears of the Allies. If I'm not mistaken, only by late 1942 the Americans learned just the names of the two latest battleships that had reinforced the ranks of the IJN only in late 1942. For this reasons, the information about them and their combat capability was not corresponding to reality. The estimates about their displacement ranged about 57'000 tons at most, and their armament was given as nine 406 mm (16-inch) guns; in reality, Yamato and Musashi each displaced more or less 69'000 tons at normal load, and carrier nine 460 mm (18.1-inch) guns. So, had the USN faced in a standard battle between two surface fleets formed around battleships, with the best of the American fast battleships facing the two mammoths of the Rising Sun, what would have happened? How would the American seamen realized that they were facing far worse monsters than they thought? Would it have been the range at which the two battleships would have likely opened fire? Would it have been the very large columns of water made by misses (if I'm not mistaken, those could be analyzed to get a rough estimate of the enemy guns' caliber, although a crude one and not without error)? Would it have been the first hit suffered by an American battleship? What do you think?

Actually, I was asking the question about how the USN would have realized that their estimates from intelligence were far from correct... They were expecting to face smaller ships with less armament than it really was.

That's always the problem, isn't it?

This is just ridicolous. So, if I wanted to play only the Iowa, I could buy her outright and just jumping happily into a match? Way to create a shipwreck, really... (pun totally intended)

Recently, I stumbled upon this site, in which an interesting contest was held; figuring out which WWII battleship was the best: http://www.combinedfleet.com/baddest.htm I found this interesting, so I thought I would share it with you guys, also because other people might read it, and might get a certain impression, as you will see. One of the contestant was the Littorio-class (there called Vittorio Veneto-class, but you know how it is with them foreigners! ). Honestly, I didn't expect them to be treated well, since I know all too well the critical factors that cramped their combat efficiency; so I wasn't expecting that the result would say that she could have taken on the Iowa or the Yamato. But honestly, after looking at the scores she was given, and the scoring system... well, there are a few critical things that make me raise my eyebrows: - Guns: the author honestly admits that he needs to go look more closely at the Littorios' 381 mm, and we all know the reason that hampered their performance (high muzzle velocity, inconsistent shell and/or bag charges); fine, we accept that. However, how can we accept the wrong maximum range for them (incorrectly given as 38,560 yards, it was more like 48.820 yards, not a small difference)? And how can we accept the stellar score that he gives to the Richelieu's guns, calling them "best all-around 15-inch guns"? Not if we take a look and read about all the problems and issues they had about the mountings, which I believe hampered them at least as much as the factors mentioned earlier hampered the Littorio's guns, at least until Uncle Sam stepped in. - Armor: I just don't understand. The author gives in the "details" page a thorough analysis of the armor system, and in the end he says that the Littorio's belt armor scheme was quite good, if we consider the spaced armor concept to be valid, and quite weigh-efficient, while the deck armor turned out to be not adequate. Which I can absolutely agree with. But then why is the final score so low? The Littorio's potential weakness in a long range engagement is so important that her not so bad belt armor can be forgotten? - Underwater protection: To be honest, here we have the opposite problem. It seems the author was quite impressed by the Pugliese system, calling it "innovative" and faulting only the construction with defective welding, and also for being difficult to repair. But does it deserve such a high score? I'm not sure, honestly... - Fire control: here the Littorio gets trounced. And why? Because of the radar, which is quite understandable, but I'm not sure wheter it's justified. True, in any late-war engagement she, together with Bismarck and Yamato, would be at a most severe disadvantage because their Allied opponents would have capability to blindfire. But frankly I think that too much weight has been given to this detail, and not enough to the period in which optical devices were still the only thing around. In that case, the Littorio would have held its own (not without problems, since some instruments and devices were not 100% reliable and efficient, of course). This kind of slipped under the table, in my opinion. - Tactical factors: nothing to say. - Secondary and anti-aircraft armament: here we start getting in trouble, of course. Of course, the relatively light AA armament, coupled with the low RoF, really drags it down, and it's right; in that department the Littorios were really at a disadvantage. However, the value of the anti-ship armament to me isn't quite right, not only because the 90 mm guns are counted (were they really expected to be used against ships?), but also because that the range of these guns is not mentioned, and that would help a bit (the 152 mm Model 1936 could fire at quite a higher distance than the US 5''/38, just to say); also, to me it seems that the unreliability of the 90 mm guns is taken a bit too far. - Operational factors: nothing to say. The author of course said that this is not meant to be taken as definitive proof, nor that it can be considered completely fair, since in some respects comparing ships would pit a 1941 Bismarck against a 1945 Iowa; and I agree, for these reasons: - Should we remember that the Littorios were the first "treaty battleships" to be laid down? Before comparing them to later designs we should consider this. - For Italy the war was over in 1943, meaning that all work on new guns (the AA mountings for the 135 mm gun? the promising 65 mm gun? a more widespread adoption of the very good 20 mm Oerlikon?) and equipment (improved radar sets?) was stopped. The other nations weren't so unlucky. What would the Iowa had been if work on all these sectors had been stopped in 1943, with no further progress? Ok, I'm done. What do you think? As much as these things bothered me, it's an interesting read, also because of some details in additional pages.

That would be good, but I doubt it, given the resources that it takes to create a working model for each ship. Beside, some of them (like France and Italy) are surely going to be here, but there has be no official announcement yet.

It did little, but it could have done quite a bit, had it been given the chance. Nothing to say about priority, absolutely. I am just saying that, given that the RN ships will come relatively fast, perhaps such a degree of complaint (not complaining per se, but the sheer amount of it) is unwarranted, compared to what people who wishes for the French or the Italian navies will have to wait, even for a premium. After all, even if for a brief time, you guys got a premium. How much before a French or Italian premium will come? Two years? Judging by some comments, it could also seem that this game is pointless until the RN comes, and after that there is no need for anything else. All I'm saying, there are people out there that have it a little worse than you. Not saying that for this you got to stop complaining, but give it a rest after a while.

I disagree. "The only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing."

I know, these guns came later than the 16-inch Mark I mounted on the Nelson-class though, and were good guns. The 16-inch guns designed for the Lion-class would have been based on them.

Since it decided that unrestricted submarine warfare was the only hope to bruing the Uk down to its knees before the Americans could declare war, mobilize and commit themselves in Europe, their failure was the failure of the whole naval strategy. Also, the focus of the Hochseeflotte didn't switch to "support the U-boote offensive"; it remained being a threat as a fleet-in-being. Wasn't the increasingly difficult situation both on the front and in Germany because of the scarcity of foodstuffs and other vital resources, coupled of course with the failure of the last offensive, the Entente counteroffensive and the implosion of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, that destabilized both the front and the internal situation, eventually forcing the Kaiser to abdicate and flee and causing a new government to rise to power, whose first act was to request an Armistice? The blockade did make a large contribution to forcing Germany into an increasingly untenable situation. Well, this is interesting. I didn't know of such a plan. It does require a huge force, nonetheless, but if they could get them... it might have worked with acceptable losses.

Well, there was confusion as to the Kaiserliche Marine's role - let's not forget that Admiral Tirpitz had envisioned it as a deterrent, so when it came to planning for an actual war against the UK things got a little vague. "Nearly decisive", which turned out not to be enough, especially when the Admiralty finaly accepted to implement the convoy system. And after all, less distant or more distant, the blockade did turn out to be a decisive weapon. In the end, as scary as it was, the German submarine force didn't win - a thing that should have been remembered: even the best submarine force in the world cannot win a war alone. In the era of the torpedo and the mine, a close blockade (meaning not just a few sweeps, but continuous patrolling) would likely prove to be too costly. I'm not sure wheter it would be seriously considered by the Admiralty...

On a tactical level, it has been described as a German success, and with some good reasons. After all, the German battlecruisers inflicted more damage on their British opponents despite their armament, speed and range disadvantage, the whole Hochseeflotte broke contact twice in a tight spot without breaking down completely as a unit, and it later slipped past the British fleet, While there are some British tactical choices that proved to be less than optimal. This on a tactical level. Of course the maintaining of the status quo and of the blockade meant that this wasn't a decisive success, and therefore strategically the Royal Navy complied with its primary objective, containing the Kaiserliche Marine and guaranteeing the blockade; destroying the Hochseeflotte came in second. You are correct, if we are talking on the tactical level. However, for this to be a decisive success, the Hochseeflotte had to cripple the Grand Fleet in a way that meant that the blockade could no longer be guaranteed. And this didn't happen; although it suffered more losses, the Grand Fleet still enjoyed a considerable degree of numerical superiority over the Hochseeflotte, therefore the bloacke remained firmly in place. In the end the status quo, which was favorable to the United Kingdom and the Royal Navy, was maintained, and this was a strategic defeat for Germany.