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About Gigaton

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  1. 'Littorio class' also gives the 80-90m but says it's only for AP and that the HE was less satisfactory due to shell design with average 'dispersion' (he does not explain what he means by dispersion here) of 160-200m. Towards the end of the book there are far more useful results from gunnery trials. D = longitudinal dispersion in meters (average of the deviation in range x2), E = range span in meters (range of shortest round - longest round): 1938: 16.5 km, D = 228, E = 342 1939: 15.8 km, D = 278, E = 405 1940: 17.6 km, D = 33 (certainly misprint), E = 462 All with full charges, type of shell not given, number of shells in salvo not given. Dispersion in line is not given either, but would certainly have been only a fraction of the dispersion in range (at least, that's is how it normally goes).
  2. Gigaton

    KMS Graf Zeppelin

    It can't, not unless Hitler wants to thrown AGNA out of the window early which might have telling effects, particularily at Munich. Only 35% of British carrier tonnage is allowed under AGNA, which is spent on the first two Graf Zeppelins.
  3. Gigaton

    KMS Graf Zeppelin

    There is practically no way that Graf Zeppelin is completed so early that she (and German carrier ops in general) could be worked up before the war. Gneisenau was completed in 3 years, Scharnhorst in 3 and half, Bismarck and Tirpitz is somewhat over 4. Following those the earliest date she is completed is about early '40 and then gets to spend the summer of that year working up in Baltic, becoming operational in early '41. In this case she might participate in the Atlantic raids and if she manages to save Bismarck this might result in Germans keeping the capital ship raiders operational for a while longer (with mixed results, IMO the best use for German capital ships was as fleet in being in Norway, not in the Atlantic). If she is completed later in 1940 or in early '41 she would not be operational before early 1942, too late to have much effect particularily as the Arctic winter is not very conductive to carrier ops and by mid '43 there are too many Allied escort carriers available to cover Russian convoys. Overall, I do not think German carrier has too great prospects for success. An Italian carrier would be a lot more interesting and strategically significant scenario as it would allow them to operate outside central Med past early 1941 (but Aquila could not have been anything except too little and too late, it would need to be a different, earlier carrier).
  4. According to John Roberts in Conway's 1922-1946: Trento, 31 knots Zara, 29 knots (Nothing gievn for Bolzano, aside legend speed and trials) Giussano, 30 knots (Anatomy of the Ship for Colleoni gives 31-32 knots) (Cadorna, See Bolzano) (Montecuccoli, See Bolzano) d'Aosta, 34 knots Abruzzi, 31 knots With Giussanos and Cadornas you can draw some parallels with the Japanese 5500 ton types (Kuma etc.). I doubt they would have been good for much more than 30 knots in service by WW2, they made 32 knots at trials at 7000+ ton trial load in '30s (which, while heavier than the original load they were designed around with greater proportion of fuel oil etc. was still not the full load, and fouling and wartime wear and tear would have further reduce that).
  5. Magazines were armoured on all British cruisers, it just was not external armour (save on some of the later cruisers, like the Fijis). Rather, there was usually a machinery belt of variable height and then internal armoured box protecting the magazines (which was lighter than a belt scheme). Italians used more traditional belt covering both magazines and machinery, and also tended to have topside positions which were better armoured (armament, bridge structure). On the flip side, the practical maximum service speeds for most Italian cruisers seem to have been in the ~30-31 knots region (Montecuccoli, d'Aosta and probably Bolzano aside), which seems to have been about as much as their British counterparts were capable of in similar conditions. This does not really have anything to do with armour of any sort. Not even battleships have underwater protection system in the bow and aft sections. Cruisers are relatively small, slim ships with large machinery in comparison to their size. They cannot afford a truly effective underwater protection system and will need to rely primarily on subdivision, even amidships. (Japanese heavy cruisers are examples of cruisers with, albit rather slim, TDS of sorts. But they also had a watertight longitudinal centerline bulkhead in the machinery which caused large off center flooding when they were hit by torpedos in the area, often leading to capsize and consequent loss of the ship. American cruisers without TDS actually did better since they did not have lonigtudinal subdivision in machinery. Even if more of the machinery might be flooded, they were in less danger of sinking. An example of type that might at first glance do slightly better doing worse in practice, because it was worse in what was actually important - subdivision in this case) d'Aosta is 70mm external + 30-35mm internal splinter bulkhead (which is not ballistic equivalent to 100-105mm, some special considerations aside two thin plates are weaker than single thick one). Seems like there was a double addition of the splinter bulkhead. The mount was unreliable though, and the stabilization had to actually be deactivated on the battleships which were modernized with it (not Littorios, IIRC this was because they were more dry). Agreed that the gun itself was good.
  6. Gigaton


    It's for Cassone's 45 000 ton battleship, not for Littorio. I did not leave a lot of depth between the holding bulkhead and the ship's sides (1.9m on each side, specifically), the underwater protection is going to be poor simply because of that. You would need to make the citadel longer (currently 67% of waterline) if you want to fit that huge machinery, 6 centerline turrets and some kind of TDS on hull of that size (which would mean more weight for armour, or less armour over the area covered). Seakeeping could be made better with more freeboard but there didn't seem to be too much on the sketch. You can DL the program for free at it's homepage (http://www.springsharp.com/), I'd recommend getting the "latest" beta if you do. It's a nifty little design/feasibility study program based on rules-of-thumb for naval design and good design practise. It's hardly final authority on anything though.
  7. Gigaton


    I took a stab at that Italian battleship with springsharp, using the visible armament layout, dimensions, tonnage (for normal displacement) and machinery power as guidelines. This take is quite horrible in seakeeping and underwater protection. The ballistic protection is quite bad too but not to same extent. It would be better to ditch those 6-in twins.
  8. Gigaton

    'Eendracht' class cruiser

    Timeline for WoWS is about 1906-1953.
  9. Gigaton

    Hood vs Bismark

    There were some initial plans at least: http://www.hmshood.com/history/construct/repair42.htm Particularily check the primary document linked near the beginning. To be fair, Italians and Japanese went for seperate anti-ship and anti-aircraft secondaries too. Russians planned to follow suit. Of the three navies that tried uniform seconday battery on new construction battleships, both French and British went for too heavy gun and got unsatisfactory compromise. French effectively reverted to seperate anti-ship and anti-aircraft secondaries with Richelieus. Even USN was interested in something more powerful than the 5-in/38, both before and after it was adopted (and they eventually did get their 5-in/54s). The 6-in gun seems to have been widely held as ideal one for anti-destroyer work. At least seperate secondaries allowed you to mount what you considered the best anti-destroyer weapon and your best AAA weapon without worrying about the latters lack of capability against surface targets.
  10. Quite normal in the mid '60s to '70s. But Austria did build more than it's fair share of them. Turrets were somewhat problematic in these fully rigged ships and arcs of fire limited anyway, hence the cental battery with it's recessed gunports (which did not work very well) made sense. All around firepower was also considered important IIRC (ie. something like HMS Hercules would have been capable of bringing more guns to battle than HMS Monarch if it needed to fight on both sides). I'm not exactly sure why Austria was so interested in providing sail power for it's battleships though. Sail was mostly seen as mean for greater endurance rather than as cost saving measure (coal was dirt cheap those days). What did Austria need great endurance for?
  11. Gigaton

    Hood vs Bismark

    Bismarck's main cable tunnels are below the main armoured deck. Specifically, they are just below it sandwiched between the magazine/machinery spaces and the 45mm torpedo bulkhead. The main cable tunnels seem to have been below MAD on Bayerns too, based the British report on Baden firings (they shot it up in 1921 for sake of research). Of course, any battleship is going to need to have cables running from below armoured deck to control positions above it. These would typically be protected to some degree but hardly invulnerable. But in any case, I don't think Bismarck's cable tube running to the armoured conning tower was actually penetrated. Few of the crew used the tube to escape from below the armoured deck. The conning tower itself was quite demolished.
  12. Gigaton

    Yamato-class battleship

    If you are asking for my opinion on Yamato's status, then I think she was certainly significant for being the largest battleship and being, essentially, the only battleship of WW2 period built to the natural size of such vessel (all the other completed ones being one way or another restricted in size by international treaties). However, I think that actually makes her somewhat less fascinating even from purely technical perspective. Nobody built a ship that was truly comparable (even if Iowa vs. Yamato is popular and persistent topic in absence of Montana, but even then Iowa's claim for parity or superiority comes more or less entirely from her radar, which isn't exactly innate to design of the ship). In comparison, the "35,000" battleships, of which seven classes were actually constructed, are of greater technical interest to me. Best in relation to it's bore? Yeah, I'd agree that it wasn't. It still does have a good claim for the most powerful one. Even when compared to Iowa's Mark 7 the argument tends to be that the Mark 7 was about or nearly as good as the Japanese 46cm in penetration and that was impressive for it's bore, rather than the US gun being more powerful on barrel-to-barrel basis. The musings on damaging effect of shells in my previous post were specifically about the US 2700lb 16-in APC vs. the Japanese 46cm APC. Despite being super-heavy the US shell has a fairly modest sized explosive filling (to the point it had smaller burster than KGV's 14-in APC). I think we should first clarify terms to be on the same page. For me precision is effectively pattern size or dispersion. Ability of the gun to hit the same spot in controlled conditions. Accuracy is a somewhat different concept, and is effectively the ability of the gun to hit for effect as part of the overall fire-control system. For example, some gun might be less precise than another but still be more accurate due to lower time of flight and flatter trajectory (giving it larger danger space, and hence greater tolerance for errors in aim), or it might be imprecise to the degree that even with more favourable trajectory it's less accurate. There are numerous things that might affect the precision of a gun. The construction of the gun and the mounting (effects like barrel and turret whip), the propellant used, the design of the shell, variation in shell and propellant weight, calibration and such. Since there are numerous causes I wouldn't even hazard to claim that the US 16-in Mark 7 was more precise than the shorter Mark 6. When comparing guns of different bores used by different navies, that caliber length tells you... nothing. Regardless of precision, Mark 7 might be more accurate than Mark 6 due to flatter trajectory and shorter time of flight, but when you compare Mark 7 to the Japanese 46cm they are actually fairly similar in those regards. The failure to produce satisfactory high powered 12-in gun forced British to upgrade (or rather, revert) to larger bore. Which essentially achieved similar results with different means (of course, specifically the 13.5/45 was somewhat more sizable upgrade over the 12/45 than the 12/50 had been, though somewhat limited for it's bore when compared to the German 12/50 at least until 1918 when 13.5/45 got the new Greenboy type shells). Yes, the fire-control radar United States could provide it's battleships (meaning at least Mark 8, preferably of late Mod. or Mark 13) would give Iowa a real advantage at night and a potentially significant advantage at longer ranges as well. The latter could be to some degree migated by using aircraft for direct spotting of salvos in range, spotting in range being a particular issue with extreme range gunnery even with good visibility (but air spotting in range is still inferior to good radar, which is why British landed their planes on cruisers and battleships as superfluous).
  13. Gigaton

    Yamato-class battleship

    The Japanese shell has comfortably larger burster so it's larger capacity for damage should be fairly obvious. The radius of the blast varies according to square root of the explosive weight, which would give about 35% advantage to the Japanese shell. IIRC, the square of burster weight rule is what Royal Artillery used as rough damage equivalency approximation during WW2, intending to take diminishing returns of larger munition into account. On fragmentation effect one would presume that US shell with relatively small burster would generate larger fragments, which might be an advantage at times, but ultimately both shells are APHE types with relatively small bursters (1.5% and 2.3%) so one would predict overall advantage to the Japanese one, with presumably more numerous higher velocity fragments. The catch with Japanese shell would be the long delay fuze, intended to prevent premature detonation before underwater hit (for example, Bismarck's deep underwater hit on PoW at Denmark Strait would probably not been possible without the shell going blind). The long delay would have reduced the effectiveness of the shells against unarmoured or lightly armoured structure, as was observed during the war. Longer barrel doesn't exactly automatically translate into more precise gun. The British 12-in/50 being a good example. It was such a failure that they eventually abandoned the bore as dead-end and went for 13.5-in. Because there were reports from sea after the Leyte battles that Japanese pattern sizes were outright too small for good gunnery (by U.S.N. officers that is) it should also be mentioned that the pattern sizes should preferably be large enough to account for expected small errors in fire-control. That is to say, if you are firing too precise salvos you might just end up being very accurate at missing the target. Excessive pattern sizes are also bad, of course. If Yamato was the only "super-battleship" in the game this might be true, but of the currently known tier 10 lineup it isn't that outstandingly well armoured. The tier 10 battleship which is capable of sticking close to enemy and taking large number of hits from the most powerful guns in the game would probably be H-41. Depending on what kind of take we see of spaced armour in the game, that main deck (which protects buoyancy, machinery, magazines, cabling etc.) might very well be practically impregnable to bombs and gunnery. You'd need to use torpedo attacks, long ranged gunnery to fish for underwater hits or just knock out the turrets one by one to disable it, or perhaps some kind of cumulative hitpoint damage form hits that do not fully penetrate (and perhaps also fires on the upper decks). Yamato I would see as fairly balanced mid to long range combatant, quite similar to Montana in use. The British N3 would probably be some kind of firepower specialist. Some other tier 10s would have higher speed, but would sacrifice either firepower (like the U.S. heavily armoured Iowa, ie. Iowa with Montana level protection but Iowa's armament) or protection (the Japanese No. 13).
  14. Gigaton

    Improved HMS Exeter (68)

    While a 8-in cruiser with 5 twin turrets was actually considered by Royal Navy in late '20s, the ship in the OP seems to be a creation of some-guy-on-the-internets, the specifications having been obviously generated with the computer program Spring Sharp. From what I can deduce from Brown's short passage of this design it was to have similar protection as the earlier unmodified 8 gun Counties - ie. ballistic box protection for magazines only with only splinter protection elsewhere (or possibly even reduced splinter protection, certainly no 4-in waterline belts or anything). Ultimately, what the British went ahead with was the better protected 8 gun Surrey, though even that project was ultimately abandoned (and with 1st London Treaty the 8-in cruiser went into hiatus). Britain did consider continuation of the 8-in cruiser in '39-'41, with 3 triple 8-in turrets being the most typical armament choise (though even re-introduction of the 9.2-in gun was, at least briefly, considered).
  15. Gigaton

    The sinking of HMS Hood by Bismarck

    The problems with Prince of Wales' main battery weren't quite that persistent. It was mostly back in operation within few hours of the battle. It's surprisingly rarely noted, but she actually engaged Bismarck a second time on the evening of 24th about half a day after sinking of Hood. The range was extreme (nearly 30km) and there was no evident damage. Bismarck didn't reply in kind this time. Prince of Wales stayed to cover the shadowing cruisers into the next morning (when the contact was lost), after which she ultimately headed for Iceland and then for Rosyth for repairs.